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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the use in the statute of the terms "firm, co-partnership or association'"
without mention of the word "corporation" could not have the effect of
divesting engineering corporations of their state charters.
NORMAN S. JEAVONS
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW
Driving While Under the Influence of Intoxicants
In 1933 the Ohio legislature passed the Liquor Control Act' which
defined "intoxicating liquor" as "all liquids and compounds containing
more than 3.2 per centum of alcohol by weight. .". ."' This definition
was retained when the Ohio Revised Code was enacted.3 Inevitably the
question arose whether this definition was applicable to Ohio Revised
Code section 4511.19 which prohibits the operation of any vehicle by one
who is under the influence of "intoxicating liquor." If it was applicable,
he who was intoxicated on "low-power" beer could drive with impunity.
In State v. Hale4 this question was answered in the negative. Initially the
court noted that the definition was preceded by the phrase "as used in the
sections of the Ohio Revised Code"5'- an indication that the definition
was to apply to section 4511.19. (Emphasis added.) However, the
court stated that the Code was not intended to change pre-existing law,'
and that the original definition was to be applied "in and for the purposes
of [the Liquor Control Act)." '  Consequently, the court concluded that
the definition was not applicable and that "low-power" beer was an "in-
toxicating liquor" within the meaning of section 4511.19.
In 1959 the Hale case was editorially criticized on the ground that
the court misinterpreted the pre-existing law through failure to consider a
section of the Liquor Control Act which provided that the definition of
intoxicating liquor was to be applied throughout the General Code and
was not to be limited to the Liquor Control Act.' This criticism was
1. 115 Ohio Laws Pt. 2,118 (1933) (now OHio REv. CODE §§ 4301.01-.991).
2. 115 Ohio Laws Pt. 2, 118 (1933).
3. OHio REV. CODE § 4301.01(A) (1).
4. 140 N.E.2d 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955), appeal dismissed, 165 Ohio St. 104, 133 N.E.2d
104 (1956).
5. OHio REv. CODE S 4301.01 (A) (1).
6. The legislature so declared its intention in OHIO REV. CODE § 1.24.
7. 115 Ohio Laws Pt. 2, 118 (1933).
8. McCrystal, Intoxicating Liquor Under the Motor Vehicle Act, 32 OHIo BAR 836 (1959).
9. 115 Ohio Laws Pt. 2, 154 (1933).
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adopted as the basis for the decision in the recent case of State v. MikolaW '
wherein it was reluctantly held that a driver who was under the influence
of "low-power" beer was not under the influence of "intoxicating liquor"
within the meaning of section 4511.19. The court recognized that the
result was absurd, but stated, in effect, that the absurdity was compelled
by a patent legislative oversight.
However, the oversight is not as patent as it is made to appear. Indeed,
had the court considered the derivation of section 4511.19 as it did the
derivation of the present Liquor Control Act, a different result might well
have been reached.
Drunken driving of a motor vehicle was first made an offense in Ohio
in 1913.11 In 1927 the statute was amended,' 2 but without any change
relevant to the problem herein discussed. The amended statute was in
force in 1933. Neither it nor its predecessor prohibited driving while
under the influence of "intoxicating liquor." Rather, the prohibition
extended to driving while in a "state of intoxication" or "under the influ-
ence of alcohol." Thus, when the Liquor Control Act was passed in 1933,
the words "intoxicating liquor," as used therein, had no counterpart in
the drunken driving statute, and the driver who was intoxicated on "low-
power" beer could well have been considered in a "state of intoxication."
The drunken driving statute was repealed in 1936 and a similar stat-
ute' was enacted as part of the Driver's License Law. 4 This statute,
too, contained no reference to "intoxicating liquor," and no problem of
definition existed. However, in 1941 the legislature created the problem
by enacting, as part of the Uniform Traffic Act,'5 a statute 6 which over-
lapped, but did not repeal, the existing drunken driving statute, and which
prohibited the operation of certain vehicles by persons under the influ-
ence of "intoxicating liquor." Certainly, the legislature overlooked the
definition of those words in the Liquor Control Act. It could not reason-
ably be supposed that the legislature intended the new drunken driving
statute to be governed by the definition of "intoxicating liquor" in the
Liquor Control Act. Such supposition attributes to the legislature the
desire to create different standards in two sections which deal with identi-
cal subject matter. Every reasonable approach to statutory interpretation
dictates that the two sections be construed in pari materia and without
reference to the Liquor Control Act This approach would have provided
10. 163 N.E.2d 82 (Ohio County Cr. 1959).
11. 103 Ohio Laws 133 (1913).
12. 112 Ohio Laws 217 (1927).
13. 116 Ohio Laws Pt. 2, 42 (1936).
14. 116 Ohio Laws Pt. 2, 33 (1936).
15. 119 Ohio aws 766 (1941).
16. 119 Ohio aws 775 (1941). This is the predecessor of OHIo REV. CODE § 4511.19.
1961]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
a simple solution to the problem prior to the enactment of the Revised
Code. Unfortunately, no case arose until after the Code was revised. The
revisers apparently recognized the duplication and it was removed. Im-
providently, the revisers chose to delete the later terminology ("state
of intoxication") and to retain the earlier (under the influence of "in-
toxicating liquor") as Ohio Revised Code section 4511.19. Thereby,
the problem presented in Hale and Mikola matured. Yet, if it is true, as
stated in Hale, that the revision effected no substantive change,"7 the
answer today should be the same as it would have been in 1941.
That Mikola is wrong does not appear from just a reading of the case,
and many members of the bench and bar have been perplexed by it.'"
Although the problem can be resolved by a close examination of prede-
cessor statutes, legislative action is needed to put an end to doubt.
Embezzlement
Essential to the common-law offense of larceny is a trespassory tak-
ing."9 Therefore, as a general rule (subject to exceptions here irrele-
vant), if the possessor of the property consents to the defendant's acquir-
ing possession, there can be no larceny.?' To fill this gap in the law of
larceny, statutes proscribing embezzlement were enacted.2? ' Typically,
these statutes apply to such categories of persons as servants, clerks,
officers, and agents who, as the result of a position of confidence or
trust, may have consentient possession of their employer's property.2 In
time, questions arose as to the scope of these categories of persons, and, in
particular, as to the meaning of "agent." A common problem concerned
the person who collected money for another. Early cases, adopting the
technical approach of the larceny cases, held not within the term
"agent" those who were entitled to commissions out of the money col-
lected, those who had a right to commingle the money with their own, or
those who had some other interest in the money - the theory being that
the money was, in part, their own and not subject to theft by them. 4
More recent cases are not in agreement; some hold the collector to be an
17. Note 6 supra and accompanying text.
18. This fact was disclosed in conversations with judges and attorneys who attended the
Western Reserve University Law-Medicine Center's Institute on Alcohol Intoxication and In-
fluence, Cleveland, Ohio, May 12-13, 1960.
19. PE KINS, CRIMINAL LAw 202 (1957) (hereinafter cited as PERKINS).
20. Id. at 203.
21. Id. at 240.
22. Note, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 1004 (1939). The Ohio provision is contained in OHIO
REV. CODE § 2907.34.
23. PERKINS 189.
24. Note 22 supra at 1005-06.
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"agent" and some do not.23 In Ohio the leading case is Campbell v.
State2" in which it was held that
Where a person, not engaged in the business of collecting moneys for
others as an independent employment, is employed to collect money for
another, subject to his direction and control, the relation of principal and
agent is thereby created. And in such case the agent may be guilty of
embezzlement, although he was to receive for his services a percentage
of the moneys collected.27  (Emphasis added.)
But what of the person who did engage in the collection business as an
independent calling? The suggestion in Campbell was that he was not
an "agent" within the statute.2' The problem lay dormant until the re-
cent case of State v. Lawrence29 in which the court (1) disregarded the
suggestion in Campbell, (2) stated that the legislature used the word
"agent" in the non-technical sense of one who does something for an-
other, and (3) held that an independent collection agent was within the
Ohio embezzlement statute even though he commingled funds and was
entitled to a commission out of the funds collected.
The Lawrence case is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it does
much to strip away from the law of theft the technicalities which arose
from the now anachronistic desire of common-law courts to restrict the
application of capital punishment30 On the other hand, it raises a real
problem of statutory construction. If the word "agent" is to have the
broad, popular meaning ascribed to it, why did the legislature specify that
the embezzlement statute applied also to officers, attorneys, clerks,
guardians, executors, administrators, trustees, assignees in insolvency,
receivers, servants, and employees?"1 It might be that the legislature
acted out of a superabundance of caution. But it might also be that
the legislature intended to treat a technical subject by using technical
terminology3 At any rate, it cannot be said that the problem has been
put to rest. Further delineation is necessary either by the supreme court
or by the legislature.
Gambling
The circumstances surrounding the commission of an offense are fac-
tors in aggravation or mitigation. If committed under certain circum-
25. Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1156 (1957).
26. 35 Ohio St. 70 (1878).
27. Id. at syllabus 3.
28. Id. at 75.
29. 168 N.E.2d 21 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
30. PEmuINs 189.
31. Omo Rsv. CODE § 2907.34.
32. This is substantially the reasoning of Justice Schaefer, dissenting in People v. Riggins, 8
Ill. 2d 78, 86, 132 N.E.2d 519, 928 (1956). Justice Schaefer also notes that if the defendant
was guilty of one embezzlement, he was equally guilty of 500 more (he had about 500
clients), and that a legislature might not want to make the collection business so hazardous.
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stances, the offense may be heinous; under other circumstances, it may
well be innocuous. Legislatures, recognizing this fact, have occasionally
imposed different punishments for the same offense or for similar of-
fenses. In Ohio, for example, the defendant may be punished either as
a felon or as a misdemeanant for carrying concealed weapons,33 or for
committing traffic manslaughter.34 A similar situation prevails with ref-
erence to gambling devices. The possession of certain devices is punished
as a misdemeanor by Ohio Revised Code section 2915.15. The posses-
sion of other devices is punished as a felony by section 2915.17.
Unfortunately, the legislature did a poor job of drafting, and it can-
not easily be determined whether a particular gambling device is within
section 2915.15 or section 2915.17."5 Section 2915.15 refers to "a gam-
bling table, or faro or keno bank, or a gambling device or machine, other
than as is defined in sections... 2915.16.... ." Section 2915.16, which
defines the term "gambling device" as used in section 2915.17, relates to
(A) Any slot machine or any other machine or mechanical device...
an essential part of which is a drum or reel with insignia thereon which
when operated may deliver, as the result of an element of chance any
money, property, or other thing of value ....
(B) Any machine or mechanical device ...designed and manu-
factured to operate by means of insertion of a coin, token, or similar
object so that when operated it may deliver, as the result of the applica-
tion of an element of chance, any money, property, or other thing of
value....
If the sections are to be construed together, section 2915.15 includes de-
vices which (1) are not coin-operated; or (2) involve no element of
chance; or (3) return nothing of value. However, suppose that a device
is coin-operated and returns free games as the result of a combination of
skill and chance, as in the case of a "pin-ball" machine. Clearly it is a
gambling device,3" but under which section does it fall? This question
was raised in State v. Smith,"7 and the answer was that section 2915.15
applies. In construing the statutes the court noted that the predecessor
of section 2915.15 originally punished as a misdemeanor the possession
of all gambling devices. In 1951 that statute was amended to except
certain devices which were brought within the provisions of the predeces-
sors of sections 2915.16 and 2915.17. As the court saw it, the purpose
33. OHIO REV. CODE § 2923.01.
34. OHIO REV. CODE § 4511.18 (punishment provided for in § 4511.99(A)).
35. A comparison of the statutes indicates that the legislature did not intend to impose alter-
nate punishments for possession of the same device.
36. "Generally, it may be said that the elements of gambling are payment of a price for a
chance to gain a prize." Westerhaus v. City of Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 335, 135
N.E.2d 318, 325 (1956). The return of free games is considered to be a prize. Westerhaus
v. City of Cincinnati, supra; Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 159
(1939).
37. 165 N.E.2d 481 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
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of the amendment was to proscribe as a felony the possession of devices
creating substantial social harm. Such harm, said the court, is created by
devices involving no skill because the player anticipates a reward with
no real effort on his part."8 However, this evil does not flow from a de-
vice involving an application of skill, even though chance is also involved,
and possession of such a device should be treated as a misdemeanor under
section 2915.15.
In reaching its decision, the court failed to consider another possible
interpretation of the statute. Section 2915.15 could be construed to ex-
dude any device which involves an element of chance, even though skill
is also involved. Whether this construction or the one adopted by the
court was intended by the legislature is a question that cannot be an-
swered. The "plain meaning" test yields no results, and further investi-
gation is frustrated by the lack of legislative history materials. 9 Al-
though the construction just suggested is not unreasonable, the court's in-
terpretation, rooted as it is in the relationship between the severity of pun-
ishment and the nature of the offense, is to be preferred.4"
Indecent Liberties
Ohio Revised Code section 2903.01 provides that
No person over the age of eighteen years shall assault a child under
the age of sixteen years, and willfully take indecent and improper
liberties with the person of such child, without committing or intending
to commit the crime of rape upon such child, or willfully make im-
proper exposures of his person in the presence of such child. (Em-
phasis added.)
Whoever violates this section is guilty of felonious assault and
shall be fined not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand
dollars or imprisoned nor less than one nor more than ten years, or both.
It will be noted that this statute proscribes the separate offenses of inde-
cent liberties and improper exposure. In construing the statute, two
problems arise: (1) is an assault an element of each offense or just of
indecent liberties, and (2) what is the meaning of "assault"?
38. Assuming that this construction is correct, a question of fact is presented as to whether
the devices in question involved an element of skill. It can be inferred from the bill of par-
ticulars, 165 N.E.2d at 482-84, that some of the devices involved chance alone.
In support of its conclusion that § 2915.15 applied, the court relied heavily on Westerhaus
v. City of Cincinnati, supra note 36. In that case, the plaintiff sought to restrain the defen-
dant from confiscating certain devices. The court held that relief was properly denied because
the devices were contraband. There are statements in the syllabus and in the opinion indicat-
ing that the devices, "pin-ball" machines, were within § 2915.15. However, the statements
are dicta. It was necessary to decide only that the devices were within either § 2915.15 or
2915.16. It was not necessary to decide that they were within a specific section.
39. This shameful condition prevails in most states. POLLACK, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
R ESEARcH 48 (1956).
40. If I may lapse into the first person singular, a style often denied to the law review writer
even when circumstances render it appropriate, my brief experience with "pin-ball" machines
left my morals unscarred. It served to demonstrate only that I lacked skill.
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Considering the first problem, it is apparent that this statute, too, is
poorly drafted, and, again, that the "plain meaning" rule affords no ready
answer. However, in two cases the problem was resolved in favor of the
conclusion that an assault is not an element of improper exposure and
that such exposure alone constitutes the offense.4
The problem of determining the meaning of "assault" presents even
greater difficulties. If the act of indecent liberties is not consented to by
the victim, there is, ipso facto, an assault,42 and the word becomes sur-
plusage. Thus, if the word is to have any operative effect, it is in a case
in which the victim has consented to the act. In this situation, the Eng-
lish common-law view was that consent negated an assault and the of-
fense of indecent liberties. 4 '  However, a substantial majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions hold that a victim, under the age of consent as regards
sexual intercourse, is also incapable of consenting to an indecent touch-
ing.44 In two early Ohio cases, the English rule was applied, 3 but there-
after the rule was severely criticized,46 and the question remained unre-
solved until the recent case of State v. Dobbins.47 The defendant was
found guilty of taking indecent liberties with a thirteen-year-old girl who
consented to the act. On appeal to the supreme court, the defendant con-
tended that an assault was an essential element of the offense and that it
was negated by consent. The court, in affirming the conviction, effec-
tively eliminated the word "assault" from the statute by the brief holding
that the act of indecent liberties constituted the assault referred to in sec-
tion 2903.01.48
The decision has much to commend it. As the court noted, it gives
greater effect to the purpose of the statute to protect children from their
41. State v. Theisen, 94 Ohio App. 461, 115 N.E.2d 863 (1953); State v. Green, 84 Ohio
App. 298, 82 N.E.2d 105 (1948).
42. State v. Green, supra note 41 at 301 (dictum); PEBKuNs 82. As used in the text above,
the word "assault" includes "battery," and the same is undoubtedly true as far as the statute
is concerned. Such use of the word "assault" is technically incorrect, but widespread.
43. Annot., 81 A.L.R. 599 (1932).
44. Id. at 601.
45. O'Meara v. State, 17 Ohio St. 515 (1867); Smith v. State, 12 Ohio St. 466 (1861). In
each case it was held that an assault with intent to commit rape could not be committed upon
a consenting victim because consent vitiated both rape and assault.
46. Snyder v. State, 92 Ohio St. 167, 110 N.E. 644 (1915). The court held that the offense
of assault was included within the offense of consentient sexual intercourse with a minor. In
so holding, the court limited O'Meara and Smith to their precise facts. The result in these
two cases has been changed by statute. OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.04 makes it an offense to
attempt to have sexual intercourse with a consenting minor. By-passing the question of whether
an assault and an attempt differ (see Fox v. State, 34 Ohio St. 377, 380 (1878)), it can be
said that young girls are now protected against their own curiosity or ignorance regarding acts
which do not culminate in intercourse but which are indecent.
47. 171 Ohio St. 40, 167 N.E.2d 916 (1960).
48. The court sidestepped O'Meara and Smith by the simple statement that they were not
controlling.
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own ignorance or misguided curiosity. Further, there is now an equiva-
lence between the offense of indecent liberties and the offenses of carnal
knowledge49 and attempted carnal knowledge;50 consent is no defense to
any one of the three crimes. And there is reason for the equivalence:
why ignore consent in the case of attempted or consummated intercourse
and give it effect in the case of indecent liberties? But did the legislature
intend equivalence? If so, why did it use the word "assault"? These
questions, ignored by the majority were raised and discussed in Judge
Taft's dissenting opinion.51  An additional question is raised by a com-
parison of the punishments for carnal knowledge, attempted carnal
knowledge, and indecent liberties. Upon conviction of carnal knowledge,
the defendant "shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one
nor more than twenty years, or six months in the county jail or work-
house."2 (Emphasis added.) For attempted carnal knowledge the pun-
ishment is one to fifteen years with the alternate misdemeanor punish-
ment.53 However, the punishment for indecent liberties is a fine of $500
to $5,000 and/or imprisonment. There is no alternate misdemeanor
punishment. Thus, there is some room to speculate that the legislature
deemed the offense of indecent liberties more serious than the other two
offenses.54 Since consent and the circumstances attending it may well
afford substantial mitigation, the argument is available that the legisla-
ture did not intend to impose liability for consentient indecent liberties.
On the other hand, the carnal knowledge statutes do not provide for the
possible alternate punishment of a fine, a provision contained in the in-
decent liberties statute. Hence, there is available the counter-argument
that the statute was intended to include consentient indecent liberties and
that the provision for a fine would be operative primarily in such cases.
The decision in Dobbins has resolved the problem without clarifying it.
49. Oimo REv. CODE 5 2905.03.
50. Omo REv. CODE § 2905.04.
51. Split decisions on questions of statutory interpretation frequently manifest the most
subtle judicial reasoning. That reasoning is briefly stated. The legislature, in enacting the
carnal knowledge statutes, specified that consent was no defense. The legislature did not do
so in the indecent liberties statute; to the contrary, it used a word inconsistent with consent.
When the legislature enacted the indecent liberties statute in 1921, the relationship between
consent and assault was well defined and unquestioned. (This latter assertion is incorrect. See
note 46 supra, and accompanying text.) Presumably, the legislature knew how to circumvent
the relationship, if it wanted to, because it did so by enacting § 2905.04 proscribing attempted
carnal knowledge. There ought to be a law covering consentient indecent liberties, but the
legislature has not enacted one. Judge Taft may well be right, in which case the legislature
was asleep at the switch, a phenomenon not unheard of. State v. Dobbins, 171 Ohio St. 40,
44, 167 N.E.2d 916, 919 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
52. OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.03.
53. OMo REV. CODE § 2905.04.
54. Note that both carnal knowledge statutes, notes 52 and 53 supra, specifically provide that
"the court may hear testimony in mitigation or aggravation of such sentence," a provision
absent from the indecent liberties statute.
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Possession of Narcotics
Ohio Revised Code section 3719.17 prohibits the procuring of a nar-
cotic drug under specified circumstances. Section 3719.15 excepts from
the operation of section 3719.17 medicinal preparations which contain
not more than two grains of opium in one fluid or avoirdupois ounce. In
Folenius v. Eckle" the question was whether paregoric is a narcotic with-
in the above sections. The court of appeals, on a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, judicially noted that paregoric contains 1.82 grains of
opium per fluid ounce, and held that it was not a narcotic drug within
the statutory definition. Accordingly, the indictment, which specified
that the accused procured paregoric, failed to allege an offense, and the
petitioner was discharged from confinement.
Some Miscellaneous Constitutional Problems
The following cases, considered in detail in the section on Constitu-
tional Law," are referred to briefly herein because of their interest to the
student of criminal law.
In State v. Mapp57 the defendant was convicted of possessing books
and pictures known to be obscene in violation of Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 2905.34. The defendant rented a room in her home to X who used
it for a short time. When the defendant learned that X was not going
to use the room for the balance of the rental period, she decided to use
the room for her own purposes, and, in packing the lodger's effects for
temporary storage, found obscene books and pictures. She did not use
these in any way, apparently only storing them in her home. A majority
of the Ohio Supreme Court held that section 2905.34 was an unconstitu-
tional infringement of freedom of speech and press to the extent that it
prohibited bare, knowing possession with no purpose to convey, exhibit,
or publish. However, the court of appeals had held the statute constitu-
tional, and, since the majority in the supreme court did not comprise six
judges, as required by the Ohio Constitution for reversal in such cases,"
the majority's decision was frustrated.
Another aspect of Mapp concerned Ohio's inclusionary rule regarding
illegally obtained evidence. Although a majority of the court adhered to
the rule, Judges Bell and Herbert dissented from applying it. It should
be remembered that the rule is judge-made and, with changes in the com-
position of the court, could be judge-abrogated in the future.
55. 109 Ohio App. 152, 164 N.E.2d 458 (1959).
56. See discussion in Constitutional Law section, pp. 467-74 sapra.
57. 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387, prob. juris. voted, 81 S. Ct. 111 (1960). See also
discussion in Constitutional Law section, p. 470 supra and in Evidence section, p. 520 infra.
58. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2. There is no evidence that this requirement gives rise to
better decisions of constitutional issues.
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The constitutionality of section 2905.34 was also considered in City
of Cincinnati v. King.9 Here, the defendant was found guilty of violat-
ing Cincinnati's anti-obscenity ordinance which does not require scienter."
He then moved for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict
and for a new trial. In part, he contended that the ordinance was invalid
because it proscribed as a misdemeanor the same conduct proscribed as a
felony by section 2905.34. The court, however, held that section
2905.34, rather than the ordinance, was unconstitutional. In so holding,
the court noted section 3767.01 which excepts from the provisions of sec-
tion 2905.34 "any motion picture film which has been approved by the
division of film censorship or any newspaper, magazine, or other publica-
tion entered as second class matter by the post-office department." The
court held that this section was an improper delegation of power to ad-
ministrative officials, that it was unreasonably discriminatory, and that it
invalidated section 2905.34 with reference to newspapers, magazines, and
other publications.
The verdict in King was returned shortly before the United States
Supreme Court, in Smith v. California,61 struck down an anti-obscenity
provision which did not require scienter. The motions in King were
heard after the Smith decision was announced, and the defendant relied
on Smith in asserting that the ordinance was unconstitutional. How-
ever, the court determined as a matter of fact that the defendant had
knowledge of the contents of the publication in question, and held that
the defendant was foreclosed from raising the scienter issue. In so hold-
ing, the court failed to consider whether the ordinance could or should
be interpreted as requiring scienter. Further, the court purportedly con-
sidered only the constitutionality of the ordinance as applied, failing to
consider the constitutionality of the ordinance on its face. Moreover, in-
adequate attention was given to the fact that the jury was not instructed
on the element of scienter. The court summarily dismissed the point by
stating the rule that a party cannot complain of an omission in instruc-
tions if he did not call the matter to the attention of the court in time to
correct the error.62 The correctness of the King decision is highly doubt-
ful.
An interesting decision, particularly from the motorist's standpoint,
is State v. Cunningham.63 The defendant was charged with exceeding
59. 168 N..2d 633 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1960). See also discussion in Constitutional Law
section, p. 471 supra.
60. CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 901.13.
61. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
62. It is to be questioned whether this rule was ever intended to apply to a case in which the
court omitted to instruct on an essential element of the offense.
63. 168 N.B2d 552 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in Administrative Law and
Procedure section, p. 444 supra and in Constitutional Law section, p. 472 supra.
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the sixty-five mile per hour speed limit established for the Ohio Turnpike
by the Ohio Turnpike Commission pursuant to a general delegation of
authority in Ohio Revised Code section 5537.16. The trial court held
that section 5537.16 was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative au-
thority in that the legislature had failed to specify standards for rule-mak-
ing. Accordingly, it was held that the affidavit, which alleged a viola-
tion of Turnpike Rule 2.3, failed to state an offense. However, on ap-
peal the decision was reversed. The court, relying on the practical neces-
sity of delegating to an administrative body the power to fix speed limits
to meet changing conditions, held that section 5537.16 was as definite as
circumstances would permit, and that it was constitutional.
An analogous problem was presented in City of Cleveland v. Baker."
The defendant, a sidewalk evangelist, was convicted of violating Cleve-
land Ordinance section 13.0941 which provides that
It shall be unlawful for persons having no occupation or business at
the places hereinafter named, to congregate upon or occupy the side-
walks, or at the corners of any street of the city, or in such manner as to
occupy the sidewalks in front of any dwelling or place of business in the
city, or in such manner as to occupy the sidewalks in Monumental parks
or other public parks of the city, or in front of any place of worship or
amusement. And it shall be and is hereby made the duty of the police
force of the city to prevent such gatherings or occupation of sidewalks
and street corners, and to arrest persons found violating the provisions
of this section. Whoever violates any provision of this section shall,
on conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not exceeding fifty dollars.
On appeal, the ordinance was held unconstitutional. Although recog-
nizing the right of a city reasonably to regulate the use of its sidewalks,
the court stated that the ordinance granted to the police the absolute dis-
cretion to prevent any gathering of persons. The ordinance was said to
be so broad that it encompassed lawful conduct, and so vague that men
of ordinary intelligence would have to guess at its intended meaning. The
ordinance contained no standards to guide law enforcement officers.
Defenses of Entrapment and Duress
In State v. Good"5 the defendant was convicted of illegal possession
for sale and illegal sale of narcotics." On appeal, he contended that the
court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defenses of entrapment
and duress. However, the conviction was affirmed by a divided court pri-
marily on the ground that the evidence did not warrant the instructions.67
64. 167 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in Constitutional Law
section, p. 474 supra.
65. 110 Ohio App. 415, 165 N.E.2d 28 (1960), prior opinion by equally divided court,
110 Ohio App. 415, 169 N.E.2d 468 (1959).
66. OHIo REv. CoDE § 3719.20.
67. On this point the judges were in bitter conflict, and the opinion affords insight into
some of the not-always-hidden pursuaders lurking in the decision-making process. The ma-
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The importance of the case lies not in the court's evaluation of evidence,
but in the subtle relationship between the defenses of duress and entrap-
ment. Suppose that the record discloses evidence relevant to some, but
not all, of the elements of duress. In the absence of other evidence, the
defense fails, and an instruction is not required. But can the evidence re-
lating to duress be considered on the entrapment issue? No, said the
majority," and thereby it ignored the basic concept of exculpation for
want of volition which underlies both defenses. To ignore this concept
and the evidence relevant thereto is to give inadequate consideration to
the question of whether the totality of the evidence and the inferences
reasonably to be drawn from it, considered in a light most favorable to
the defendant, reaches that minimal point at which an instruction is
required.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Indictment
In 1959 the Ohio legislature enacted Ohio Revised Code section
2941.021 which permits a defendant to waive indictment as to any of-
fense not punishable by death or life imprisonment. The purpose of this
section is to afford a speedy trial to one who intends to plead guilty and
who otherwise might have to wait several months for the return of a true
bill."9 This beneficial purpose was ignored by a court of common pleas
which, in State v. Centers,"° held that the statute was unconstitutional.
The court stated that the Ohio constitutional requirement of indictment
in all felony cases71 was mandatory, jurisdictional, a matter of public in-
terest, and, therefore, non-waivable.
In Ohio, there is authority for permitting a defendant to waive rights
jority, emphasizing the insidious effect of traffic in narcotics, and making the questionable
assertion that "the safety of the public is the primary consideration of all agencies of law en-
forcement," 110 Ohio App. at 430, 165 N.E.2d at 38, virtually refused to draw from the facts
any inferences favorable to the defendant. The refusal is singularly at odds with the rule,
recognized by the majority, that an instruction should be given if there is any evidence, which,
considered in a light most favorable to the defendant, raises the issue. The dissenting judge
deemed irrelevant the evils of narcotics, and was not at all reluctant to draw inferences favor-
able to the defendant The disputed facts are too complicated to be discussed in detail herein.
Suffice it to say that the dissenting judge has the better of the argument.
68. "[The defendant's) testimony in a number of places suggests that he acted in fear because
of the many references to the *gun' said to have been carried by. . [the police informer).
Such references could have application only to a claim of duress and could have no applica-
tion in support of a claim of entrapment." 110 Ohio App. at 425-26, 165 NYE.2d at 35.
69. In small counties the grand jury meets infrequently. In large counties, where crime is
more prevalent, quick return of a true-bill may be prohibited by a backlog of cases. Cleveland
Plain Dealer, Dec. 25, 1959, p. 18, col 1.
70. 162 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio C.P. 1959). See also discussion in Constitutional Law section,
p. 473 supra.
71. OIo CONsr. art. , 5 10.
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guaranteed to him by the Ohio Constitution.72 There is similar authority
regarding the United States Constitution.78 However, a problem exists in
balancing the individual's desire to waive'a right against society's interest
in maintaining it. It has been asserted that if society's interest is but
peripheral, waiver should be permitted; conversely, if society's interest
can be regarded as paramount, waiver should not be permitted.74
Courts are not in agreement regarding waiver of indictment.75 Cer-
tainly, the grand jury system permits the community, through selected
representatives, to exercise some control over over-zealous prosecutors.
To this extent there exists a valid public interest in maintaining the in-
dictment. However, the grand jury, particularly in a metropolitan area,
is overworked and cannot devote adequate time to considering each case
before it. Consequently, the public interest is not effectively served.
Further, only the accused who intends to plead guilty will seek to waive
indictment. The accused who intends to plead not guilty will not give
up the chance of a no-bill. These facts lend cogent support to the argu-
ment that section 2941.021 is constitutional, and it is hoped that appro-
priate emphasis will be given to them when the Ohio Supreme Court ul-
timately resolves the issue.7(a)
Speedy Trial
The Ohio Constitution grants to a defendant the right to a speedy
trial.7" Is this right violated when the state delays almost thirty months
in taking action against one who by affidavit has been accused of a crime
and who during that period has been in the state penitentiary for another
crime? Yes, said the court in State v. Waites.77 It is of no consequence
that the defendant has been imprisoned for another offense.7" Further, if
both offenses are known to law enforcement officials at the time of the
72. State ex rel. Warner v. Baer, 103 Ohio St. 585, 134 N.E. 786 (1921) (trial by jury).
73. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (trial by jury); Trono v. United States,
199 U.S. 521 (1905) (double jeopardy).
74. 67 HARV. L. REv. 344 (1953), criticizing United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 281 App. Div.
395, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 174 (1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954) (press associa-
tion held without standing to attack order excluding public from courtroom).
75. Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947)
(waiver permitted; FED. R. CRlM. P. 7 (b), providing for waiver, held constitutional); Hawk
v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W.2d 561 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 923 (1950) (all
rights guaranteed by state constitution may be waived); People ex rel. Battista v. Christian,
249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111 (1928) (public interest precludes waiver).
75 (a). After the above comment was written, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Ex parte Stephens,
171 Ohio St. 323, 170 N.E.2d 735 (1960), upheld the constitutionality of § 2941.021, two
judges dissenting. The majority was of the opinion that the statute did not deprive the ac-
cused of any right; it merely gave him an option to demand or waive indictment. See also
discussion in Constitutional Law section, p. 473 supra.
76. OMO CONST. art. 1, § 10.
77. 163 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1959).
78. Shafer v. State, 43 Ohio App. 493, 183 N.E. 774 (1932).
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first trial, the delayed second trial deprives the defendant of the chance of
concurrent sentences and subjects him to consecutive sentences.7 9 Not
only is this an infringement of the defendant's rights, the court stated, it
is also a usurpation of the powers of the court and parole board under the
indeterminate sentence law.8
The constitutional provision for a speedy trial has been supplemented
by statute. Ohio Revised Code section 2945.71 provides that if an in-
carcerated accused is not tried within two terms after the term in which
he is charged by indictment or information, he shall be discharged unless
he has caused the delay. Section 2945.72 effects a three-term limitation
in the case of an accused who has been released on bail. If during the
third term there is not enough time to try the accused, he shall either be
tried at the next term or be discharged. Section 2945.73 adds the fol-
lowing exception:
When application is made for the discharge of a person under sec-
tion 2945.71 or 2945.72 of the Revised Code, if the court is satisfied
that there is material evidence for the state which cannot be had, that
reasonable effort has been made to procure it, and that there is just
ground to believe that such evidence can be had at the next term, the
cause may be continued and the prisoner remanded or admitted to
bail...
The operation of sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 and the relationship
between these sections and section 2945.73 were considered in the recent
case of State v. Cunnipgham.8 ' The defendant was indicted for burglary
during the April 1956 term and was released on bail. No action was
taken on his case during the terms of September 1956, January 1957,
April 1957, and September 1957. During the January 1958 term, the
defendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground that he had not
been brought to trial within three terms as required by section 2945.72.
The motion was denied pursuant to section 2945.73, and the case was
continued to the April 1958 term. Thereafter, the case was continued
to the September 1958 term, apparently because there was not enough
time to try it. After his conviction, the defendant appealed, contending
that he had been deprived of his constitutional and statutory rights to a
speedy trial. The court of appeals reversed on both grounds.82  On ap-
peal by the state to the supreme court, the decision was reversed in an
opinion unexplainedly limited to the statutory issue.
The court first considered whether the defendant was entitled to dis-
charge, without specifically applying for it, following the third term of
79. State v. Milner, 149 N.B.2d 189 (Ohio C.P. 1958); see Culp, Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, Survey of Ohio Law - 1958, 10 Wnsr. RES. L. RIv. 373, 385 (1959).
80. OHio Rnv. CODB ch. 2965.
81. 171 Ohio St. 54, 167 N.E.2d 897 (1960).
82. The dedsion is unreported.
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non-action. Relying on two early cases,8" the court held that section
2945.73 contemplates action by the defendant to secure his discharge un-
der sections 2945.71 and 2945.72. Accordingly, an automatic discharge
did not result from the failure to try the defendant during the April 1957
term. This conclusion having been reached, it followed that, during the
January 1958 term, the trial court, upon the required showing, properly
invoked section 2945.73 and continued the action until the April 1958
term. However, the crucial question was whether there could be a subse-
quent continuance. Again relying on an early case,84 the court held that
the continuances provided for in sections 2945.72 (for want of time) and
2945.73 (to obtain material evidence), were not mutually exclusive, and
that a continuance for want of time could be granted even though a con-
tinuance to obtain material evidence had previously been granted.
Although Cunningham merely restates existing Ohio law, a substan-
tial question is raised by the court's failure to consider the constitutional
issue. The right to a speedy trial is basic to a fair administration of crimi-
nal law. An accused whose case is not disposed of with reasonable speed
is consigned to a sort of limbo. Social contacts are made embarrassing;
business opportunities must often be passed up. The alternatives are
either to "jump bail" or to wait. Eventually the accused may demand
an immediate trial.85 If, at this point, the prosecution requests a continu-
ance to obtain material evidence under the conditions set forth in section
2945.73, a further delay is probably justified. But thereafter the case
should be given priority over all other cases except previously delayed
criminal cases which have been set for immediate trial. To excuse further
delay by the plea of "crowded docket" is to permit inadequate judicial
machinery inadequately administered to take precedence over constitu-
tional rights.
By its failure to consider the constitutional issue, the court has in-
articulately superimposed the statutory right and its restrictions on the
constitutional right and has, unfortunately, diluted the latter.
Voir Dire
A code of criminal procedure is a complex creation, a composite of
hundreds of sections which declare that certain things be done in a certain
83. Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876); Ex parte McGehan, 22 Ohio St. 442 (1872).
84. Johnson v. State, 42 Ohio St. 207 (1884).
85. In a majority of jurisdictions, an accused, by failing to demand an immediate trial,
waives his right. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 326 (1958). A minority of jurisdictions has
adopted a contrary rule, id. at 334, thereby avoiding penalizing the accused for what is
often the ignorance or indolence of counsel. Ohio's position is not well defined. Those
cases which require a demand deal only with the statutory right. State v. Cunningham, supra
note 81; Ex parte McGehan, supra note 83; State v. Suspirata, 71 Ohio App. 500, 50 N.E.2d
270, appeal dismissed, 141 Ohio St. 456, 48 N-E.2d 468 (1943). However, it has been held
that a demand is not a necessary prerequisite to exercising the state constitutional right. Shafer
v. State, supra note 78; State v. Milner, supra note 79.
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manner. Suppose that a section is violated without immediate objection
by the defendant. Thereafter the error is called to the attention of coun-
sel and an objection is made. Is it untimely? Has a waiver been effected
because counsel was not sufficiently alert? If not, is a premium placed
on indolence or inexperience? If the defendant appeals, is it necessary
that he make a showing of prejudice, or will prejudice be presumed?
Does it make any difference whether the statute grants to the defendant
a right which a court might characterize as "basic" or "jurisdictional"?
And how are such characterizations arrived at?
Put these questions in a fact setting. A statute provides that pro-
spective jurors be sworn before examination. However, the provision is
not followed and the prospective jurors are examined without oath. A
jury is selected, sworn, and the trial proceeds. Opening statements are
made, and the prosecution calls nineteen witnesses. On the third day of
trial, the judge realizes the error and asks defense counsel to waive it.
He refuses. The judge then asks defense counsel to consent to discharg-
ing the jury and to starting the trial anew. Again, he refuses. The trial
continues, the defendant is found guilty, and he appeals, assigning as
error the court's failure to follow the statutory procedure.
How will a court of review approach the problem? Perhaps the
question is inartfully phrased. In what ways can a court of review ap-
proach the problem? The simple answer is that it can do so in a number
of ways as is suggested by the questions posed above. Often a court will
fail to state these questions. But it answers them, or at least some of
them, and thereby it indicates its approach and the factors relied upon
as a basis for decision. "Factors" is the key word. The so-called basic
right, the jurisdictional element, the necessity for showing prejudice, the
reluctance to permit a party to rely upon his own failure to act can all be
factors of decision.
Once the decision has been made, how can it be critically evaluated?
It may be subject to criticism on the ground that the relevant factors were
not considered. But suppose they have been considered. Is the critic
stymied? Not necessarily. He can disagree with the answer to a partica-
lar factor-question. He can, for example, deem basic or jurisdictional
that which the court says is not. But, although he may be able to muster
some historical weapons, empirically he is out in the cold. To take an-
other tack, he can disagree with the weight accorded a particular factor,
but the factor-weighing process is not very productive. Thus, although
not completely blocked, the critic finds his work frustratingly unincisive
and not a little carping.
This low-order jurisprudential essay accurately portrays the problems
confronting him who would comment on the recent case of State v.
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Glaros."6 The facts of the case are substantially as set out above. " The
decision, by a sharply divided court, was that the error was waived by
counsel's failure immediately to raise the issue."8 Initially, the majority
relied upon what might be labelled a "control" or "fair-play" factor. The
error occurred in the presence of defense counsel; it was within his con-
trol to call it to the attention of the court and to have it rectified at the
outset. Having failed to do so, said the majority, he cannot be permitted
to seek the advantage of a favorable verdict and, at the same time, to dis-
claim the onus of an unfavorable one. 9 Next, the majority, relying upon
Ohio Revised Code section 2945.83 (E) (harmless error), asserted that
the defendant, by failing to show that any juror had made a false state-
ment, had failed to show prejudice resulting from the error. The defend-
ant countered with the argument that the error was of such a nature that
a showing of prejudice was not necessary. In parrying, but not meeting,
this contention, the majority noted several cases from other jurisdictions
holding that a waiver was effected by counsel's failure to raise the issue
before voir dire.9" The majority also noted several Ohio cases requiring
a showing of prejudice in other situations.9' Finally, the majority, deal-
ing with the "basic rights" factor, put it aside by stating that only a statu-
tory prerogative was involved in the case at bar.92
The dissenting judges viewed the statutory prerogative as a basic
86. 170 Ohio St. 471, 166 N.E.2d 379 (1960). See also discussion in Evidence section,
p. 520 infra.
87. The statute involved is OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.27.
88. A similar result has been reached in a civil case. In re Appropriation of Easement for
Highway Purposes, 108 Ohio App. 432, 162 N.E.2d 190 (1958), appeal dismissed, 169 Ohio
St. 314, 159 N.E.2d 451 (1959); see also Sonenfield, Evidence, Survey of Ohio Law - 1959,
11 WEsT. REs. L REV. 379, 384 (1960).
89. A number of cases were cited by the majority, almost all of which concerned counsel's
failure to complain of an omission in instructions. See, e.g., State v. Tudor, 154 Ohio St. 249,
95 N.E.2d 385 (1950); Rucker v. State, 119 Ohio St. 189, 162 N.E. 802 (1928).
The majority's comment regarding speculation on the outcome of the case would have
more weight if, as in Hilton & Dodge Lumber Co. v. Ingram, 135 Ga. 696, 70 S.E. 234
(1911), the issue were raised after verdict. Further, the speculation argument rests upon the
tacit assumption that counsel was immediately aware of the error but did not make it known.
On the facts of State v. Glaros, supra note 86, there is no basis for the assumption. True,
counsel's refusal to waive the defect and to consent to a mistrial indicates that he was playing
both ends against the middle. But why not? The issue was one of first impression in Ohio
criminal law. And, indeed, when it was finally resolved, three judges agreed with counsel.
On the converse of the "control" point, see Doyle v. State, 17 Ohio 22 (1848) in which a
grand juror was unqualified, an error which the defendant could not raise at the time it oc-
curred. It was held that the error was jurisdictional and that it could be asserted at the trial
by a plea in bar.
90. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ware, 137 Pa. 465, 20 Ad. 806 (1890).
91. See, e.g., State v. Moon, 124 Ohio St. 465, 179 N.E. 350 (1931) (trial court failed to
instruct jury not to consider the possible punishment); Warner v. State, 104 Ohio St. 38,
135 N.E. 249 (1922) (trial court failed to instruct jurors regarding their conduct while
separated); Tingue v. State, 90 Ohio St. 368, 108 N.E. 222 (1914) (judge was absent during
part of final argument).
92. That part of the statute requiring the administration of an oath was enacted in 1957.
127 Ohio Laws 420 (1957).
[June
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1960
right. Asserting that the legislature intended to give the defendant full
protection against the possibility of false statements, the minority con-
duded that the jury was not properly impaneled. Regarding the defend-
ant's failure to show prejudice, the minority was satisfied with the possi-
bility of unknown challenges for cause.
Thus, an issue of first impression has been resolved in an opinion'
which affords some insight into the decisional process.9 3
Bench Trial - Conduct of the Court
Prior to the presentation of evidence, a judge will frequently admon-
ish the jurors to keep an open mind and not to form an opinion until the
case is concluded. This admonition is of obvious importance in an ad-
versary system. An evaluation of a witness' testimony must embrace not
only direct and cross-examination but also the testimony of other wit-
nesses. What appears to be a strong case for the plaintiff may be dis-
sipated by the defense's case; and an apparently strong defense case may
be demolished by rebuttal evidence. In view of these statements, the case
of State v. Kicak 4 must be regarded as shocking. The defendant was
convicted in a bench trial of indecent liberties. After the direct examina-
tion of one of the prosecution's witnesses,"5 the court stated
I think that's enough, and make your cross-examination shor4 I be-
lieve this child. I don't want to put her under any further torture, I
believe her and that's that. Just don't be, - you handle her right.P6
On appeal, the defendant contended that the judge had made up his mind
as to the defendant's guilt and that it was useless to present the defense's
case. 7  However, the court summarily dismissed this contention with a
citation to Crosby v. State."8 In Crosby, during direct-examination of the
defendant, the judge, who was the trier of fact, stated that he did not be-
lieve the defendant. The court held the statement not to be prejudicially
erroneous. It is questionable whether Crosby was correctly decided. As-
93. An issue not resolved is whether the trial court could have declared a mistrial. Absent
the consent of both parties, the only possible ground for mistrial is found in OHio REV. CODE
5 2945.36(A) which gives the judge the discretionary authority to declare a mistrial for
"accident." The minority was willing to regard the error as an accident within this provision.
In addition, it was stated that because the jury was not properly impaneled, the court had the
inherent power to declare a mistrial. Is this statement at odds with the oft-repeated statement
that there is no common-law criminal procedure in Ohio?
94. 168 N.E2d 768 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959), cort. denied, 362 U.S. 949, rehearing denied,
364 U.S. 855 (1960).
95. It is not clear from the opinion whether the witness was the complainant or her sister.
96. State v. Kicak, supra: note 94 at 768.
97. The defense did, in fact, present its case which included the defendant's testimony of
denial. The opinion does not indicate the extent of the cross-examination of the prosecution's
witness. Nor does the opinion indicate whether the defendant argued that the trial court
infringed upon the right to cross-examine.
98. 9 Ohio L. Abs. 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930).
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suming that it was, it is easily distinguishable. A statement that the trier
of fact does not believe a particular witness does not necessarily preclude
the presentation and reasoned consideration of other testimony. How-
ever, a statement that the trier of fact believes a key witness for the prose-
cution does effectively preclude a dispassionate evaluation not only of
the cross-examination of that witness, but also of contradictory testimony
adduced by the defense. The court should have held that the statement
was prejudicial error.
Evidence - Presumptions
In the era of the automobile, law enforcement officers have special
problems: the traffic policeman cannot, on foot, pursue the motorist
who speeds or who commits some other moving violation; the benefits
of pursuit by vehicle may be outweighed by attendant dangers; and, in
the case of a stationary violation, the policeman is seldom present when
the offense is committed. These problems make it difficult for the prose-
cution to prove an essential element of the traffic offense - the identity
of the driver.
Common experience dictates that, in a substantial majority of cases
involving private, passenger vehicles, the driver is the owner. Of course,
this statement has no all-inclusive validity, and not infrequently the
driver is a relative or friend of the owner. Nevertheless, the force of
common experience and the desire not to impose an unreasonable burden
on the prosecutor have led some courts and legislatures to adopt the in-
ference, from proof of ownership, that the owner is the driver.9 By such
a method, the City of Columbus has sought to facilitate the prosecution
and conviction of stationary violators. The Columbus Traffic Code
section 2151.06 provides that
If any vehicle is found upon the street . . . in violation of any ...
ordinance of this city, regulating the stopping or standing or parking of
vehicles, and the identity of the driver cannot be determined, the owner
or person in whose name such vehicle is registered shall be held prima
facie responsible for such violation.
In City of Columbus v. Webster °' 9 the constitutionality of this ordinance
was sustained as against the contentions (1) that it was in conflict with
general state law;'.. (2) that it created a rule of evidence; and (3) that
it derogated from the presumption of innocence.
With reference to the first contention, the court noted that the legis-
lature has granted to municipalities authority to regulate the stopping,
99. Comment, 33 MicH. L REv. 1231 (1935); 34 TEXAS L. REv. 939 (1956).
100. 170 Ohio St. 327, 164 N.E.2d 734 (1960). See also discussion in Evidence section,
p. 519 infra.
101. See OHIO CoNsT. art. XVII, S 3.
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standing, and parking of vehicles." 2 The court concluded that munici-
palities also had the power to enforce such regulations. With reference
to the second and third contentions, the court summarily stated that the
ordinance did not create a rule of evidence and that it did not affect
the presumption of innocence." 3
No argument was made that the statute created an unreasonable
presumption. Had it been made, the court could have disposed of it
easily. In determining whether a presumption is unreasonable, the oft-
stated test is whether there is a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact presumed.' In view of what has already been
said regarding common experience, it can hardly be doubted that the
court would ha've found a rational connection between the proof of
ownership and the presumption of identity.
In sustaining the constitutionality of the ordinance the court has
aligned Ohio with a majority of the jurisdictions which have considered
the problem or a variation thereof,0 5 and the court has put to rest any
question of the constitutionality of such an ordinance as related to park-
ing. However, other questions remain. First, what is the nature of
the presumption; is it a conclusive presumption or merely a permissible
inference? It is generally held that only a permissible inference may be
drawn. 6 The use of the words "prima fade" in the Columbus ordi-
nance would dictate the same result. This conclusion is buttressed by the
court's reliance upon City of St. Louis v. Cook'"7 in which it was empha-
sized that the ordinance there in question created but a permissible in-
ference.
Second, in the absence of statute or ordinance, can the inference be
drawn? The courts of other jurisdictions are not in agreement,' and
102. OHIo REv. CODE § 4511.07 (A).
103. Neither of these statements is completely true. In effect, the ordinance creates a rule
regarding the sufficiency of evidence for purposes of withstanding a motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal. Also, it derogates from the presumption of innocence which applies to
the issue of identity, i.e., it is presumed that the defendant did not do the act charged. How-
ever, all of this is hardly significant in a state which permits the prosecutor to comment upon
the accused's failure to take the stand. OHIo CONsT. art. I, § 10. On the interesting question
of whether the presumption of innocence applies to minor traffic offenses, see Note, 47 J.
CRIM. L, C. & P.S. 64 (1956).
104. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
105. The cases are collected in Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 456 (1956). A valuable treatment of
these cases is to be found in 34 TEXAS L REv. 939 (1956).
106. 34 TEXAS L. REV. 939, 940 (1956).
107. 359 Mo. 270, 221 S.W.2d 468 (1949).
108. Note 106 supra. The author indicates that, with reference to illegal parking, some
courts have permitted the inference, while others have not. As to other traffic offenses, courts
are reluctant to permit the inference. In People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d
377 (1955), a speeding case, the court refused to permit a common-law inference even though
the court had previously sustained a statutory inference in a parking case. People v. Rubin,
284 N.Y. 392, 31 NXE.2d 501 (1940). For arguments that the inference should be permitted
in both cases, see 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 847, 848 (1956).
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there is a paucity of authority in Ohio. In a civil case it was indicated
that the inference could be drawn."0 9 But in two lower-court criminal
cases there was a difference of opinion."'
Finally, it must be asked whether sound policy underlies the ordi-
nance. The answer involves a balance of the interests of the individual
against the necessity for effective law enforcement. In this regard,
several factors should be considered. It can be argued against such or-
dinances that they make it easier for the prosecution to prove its case,
an approach which is not consonant with traditional concepts of Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence. On the other hand, these ordinances
are generally limited to minor traffic offenses"' with minimal punish-
ments and little or no social stigma. Further, the identity of the driver
is generally within the particular knowledge of the owner-defendant, and
it may well be unrealistic to place the traditional burden of proof on
the prosecutor. Moreover, if the driver is not the owner, it is likely that
he is a relative or close friend, and it is unlikely that he will remain silent
and subject the owner to prosecution. On balance, therefore, it seems
that such ordinances are supported by sound policy.
Verdict - Polling the Jury
In most states, by constitutional provision, statute, or common law,
the defendant has a right to poll the jury following the announcement of
a verdict of guilty."' In Ohio, the right is provided for by Ohio Revised
Code section 2945.77 which states that
Before the verdict is accepted the jury may be polled at the request
of either the prosecuting attorney or the defendant. If one of the jurors
upon being polled declares that said verdict is not his verdict the jury
must further deliberate upon the case.
The purposes of polling the jury are to ascertain whether the requisite
number of jurors have concurred in the verdict and to afford any juror
the opportunity further to consider the verdict and to dissent from it."'
The juror is asked, "Is this your verdict?""' 4  If the juror's answer is
evasive or qualified, he can be directed to answer yes or no." 5 If his
109. Renner v. Pennsylvania R.R., 103 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951), afpld sub
nom. Kyes v. Pennsylvania R.R., 158 Ohio St. 362, 109 N.E.2d 503 (1952).
110. Burke v. Cincinnati, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 589 (C.P. 1929) (inference could be
drawn); McCarthy v. City of Cincinnati, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 362 (C.P. 1928) (inference
could not be drawn). It is stated in Burke, supra at 591, that McCarthy was affirmed in an
unreported decision.
111. But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 1212 (1960) which applies the presumption to all
violations of the motor vehicle code.
112. 5 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDRnE § 2142-43 (Anderson ed. 1957). On
the polling of juries in civil cases, see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 640 (1960).
113. 5 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 112, § 2142.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
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ultimate answer is yes, further inquiry is inadmissible.1 ' If his ultimate
answer is no, the jury will be directed to deliberate further."'
The primary problem arising from polling the jury strikes at the
very heart of the jury system and relates directly to the conduct of human
beings who are called upon to decide a controversy. Suppose that eleven
jurors agree on a verdict of guilty. The remaining juror is then sub-
jected to pressure. He is a holdout, and his doubts are easily character-
ized by the majority as unreasonable. It is his fault that the jurors who
have reached agreement must remain in close quarters away from their
homes and businesses. In such circumstances, it is not difficult to suc-
cumb, to abandon a position theretofore earnestly defended, and to give
reluctant assent to the verdict. But what happens when the jurors re-
turn to the courtroom and are polled individually? The reluctantly as-
senting juror is now confronted by the accused whose guilt he still doubts.
He is exposed to public view, and, in a tense situation, must publicly
declare his verdict of guilty. He may do so without qualms; or he may
succumb to the new pressure and dissent from the verdict; or, mindful
of his prior assent, perhaps afraid that a flat dissent will now provoke
the wrath of his collegues or the judge and result in unknown trouble,
yet torn by conscience, he may register a mild assent, one so hedged by
attempted explanations that his verdict is difficult to ascertain.
Such was the situation presented in the recently reported case of
State v. Brown."18 One juror, in tears, stated that she had assented to
the verdict because she was "the only one left.""' 9 Forced to give a
direct answer, she stated "Yes, but I have told you -. ""0 She was per-
mitted to make no further explanation, and her verdict of guilty was
accepted. On appeal, the judgment was reversed. The court stated that
although it was not proper to permit a juror to explain his vote, there
should be no doubt in a criminal case that an affirmative vote is given.
On the facts, it appeared to the court that the juror was desirous of chang-
ing her verdict and that she was not given an opportunity to do so. In
reaching its decision, the court distinguished the case of Emmert v.
State'2 on the ground that the jurors there ultimately answered in the
affirmative and expressed no desire to change their verdict even though
they indicated that they had assented so as not to be holdouts. Emmert
is an example of reluctant assent which remains an assent. Brown is an
example of assent so reluctantly given that it becomes, at the very least,
116. ibid.
117. OHIo REv. CODE § 2945.77.
118. 110 Ohio App. 57, 168 N.E.2d 419 (1953). It is not known why the report was de-
lyed for seven years.
119. Id. at 58, 168 N.E.2d at 420.
120. Iuid.
121. 127 Ohio St. 235, 187 N.E. 862 (1933).
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attempted dissent. It is the tacit holding of Brown that an attempted
dissent vitiates the verdict of guilty. The holding strikes a nice balance
between the necessity for rules of law and the recognition that these rules,
which relate to human conduct, must be interpreted in the light of human
conduct.
Sentence
A defendant, by means of one act, or in the course of a single transac-
tion, may commit several offenses. In such a case, the following ques-
tions arise: (1) may the defendant be charged with each offense; (2) if
so, may he be convicted of each offense; and (3) if so, may he be
sentenced for each offense? Ohio Revised Code section 2941.04 answers
the first and second questions by stating that the defendant may be
convicted of "two or more different offenses connected together in their
commission, or different statements of the same offense." Regarding
sentence, it is dear in Ohio that if, by a single act, the defendant kills or
injures multiple victims, he commits separate offenses and may be
sentenced for each one.' Beyond this rule, there is no agreement. Sup-
pose that the defendant, during a single transaction, and by a concatena-
tion of several acts, commits separate offenses. If a court chooses to
emphasize the several acts and the separate offenses, multiple sentences
will be permitted.' On the other hand, if the court chooses to empha-
size the single transaction, multiple sentences will not be permitted. 4
This latter approach was adopted in the recently reported case of State v.
Weed'25 in which the defendant was sentenced for (1) possession of
explosives with intent to use them for an unlawful purpose, 6 (2) pos-
session of the same explosives and placing them on another's property
without his consent,'27 (3) possession of the same explosives and at-
tempting to use them to the injury of another's property, 28 and (4)
122. State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St. 539, 96 N.E.2d 776 (1951) (traffic manslaughter);
State v. Sharier, 93 Ohio App. 191, 112 N.E.2d 551 (1952) (failure to provide for four
children); in some states it is held that the unlawful, unintentional killing of multiple victims
is but a single act of manslaughter. See 21 U. ClNc. L. REv. 492 (1952).
123. State v. Trunzo, 137 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (burglary, larceny, forcible
opening of a safe); Wyatt v. Alvis, 136 N.E.2d 726 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955) (burglary, lar-
ceny). In the Wyatt case the court confused separate transactions with separate offenses. It
correctly concluded that there were separate offenses; it incorrectly concluded that there were
separate transactions.
124. State v. Greeno, 89 Ohio App. 241, 101 N.E.2d 259 (1950), appeal dismissed, 155
Ohio St. 589, 99 N.E.2d 613 (1951) (defendant could not be convicted of both aiding in the
issuance of checks with intent to defraud and obtaining automobiles with the same checks -
larceny by trick).
125. 110 Ohio App. 186, 169 N.E.2d 39 (1954). It is not known why the report was
delayed.
126. OHIO REV. CODE § 3743.25.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
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malicious destruction of property. 9 On appeal, the court held that but
one transaction was involved and that the defendant could be sentenced
only for the most serious offense.13
The result in these cases is said to depend upon whether one offense
requires proof of the same facts as does the other. If so, multiple sentences
are prohibited; if not, they are permitted. This evidentiary test derives
from the state constitutional proscription against double jeopardy'.. and
from the "same evidence" test which is used to determine whether the
defendant has twice been put in jeopardy for the same offense. 32 The
problem of double jeopardy is not without relevance in this area even
though separate trials are not involved. Suppose, for example, that the
defendant, in a single trial, is charged with and convicted of both a
greater inclusive offense and a lesser included offense. Obviously these
offenses arise from the same conduct; and just as obviously the defendant
has twice been placed in jeopardy for the same offense - the lesser
included offense. Thus, in the recent case of State v. Johnson" it was
held that the defendant could not be convicted of both possession for
sale and bare possession of the same narcotics. 34
However, to overemphasize the double jeopardy problem and its
concomitant evidentiary test, to use the test in cases in which double
jeopardy is not an available defense, is to ignore criteria which are more
consonant with the purposes of criminal law: whether the defendant has
demonstrated by his acts that he is a dangerous person, who may need
extended rehabilitation, and whether society needs the protection af-
forded by multiple sentences. Blind adherence to the evidentiary test
results in permitting multiple sentences merely because they are not
precluded on grounds of double jeopardy, even though multiplicity may
serve no purpose.13 5
129. Omo REv. CODE § 2909.01.
130. The court was divided as to the offense for which the defendant should be sentenced.
One judge, on the basis of his evaluation of the criminal acts involved, was of the opinion
that the defendant should be sentenced for malicious destruction of property, the punishment
for which offense cannot exceed imprisonment for seven years. Osno REv. CODE § 2909.01.
However, the majority deemed the most serious offense to be the one carrying the heaviest
penalty - any one of the possession offenses which, under OrIo REv. CODE § 3743.25, are
punishable by imprisonment from one to twenty years.
131. Omo CONsT. art I, § 10.
132. See Duvall v. State, 111 Ohio St. 657, 146 N.E. 90 (1924).
133. 165 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
134. Although not mentioned by the court in State v. Weed note 125 supra, the offense of
possession of explosives and attempting to use them to the injury of another's property in-
dudes the offense of possession of the same explosives with intent to use them for an unlawful
purpose.
135. See State v. Benjamin, 102 Ohio App. 14, 132 N.E.2d 761, appeal dismissed, 165 Ohio
St. 455, 135 N.E.2d 765 (1956), in which it was held that the defendant could be convicted
and sentenced for maiming by destroying an eye and the same maiming by means of a caustic
substance. The Benjamin case, it should be noted, does not involve separate acts and a single
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In view of the disparity in case law and the unwarranted emphasis
on concepts of double jeopardy which, as applied, avail the defendant
nothing, it is time for a re-evaluation of the problem by legislative and
judicial authority.
Judgment - Collateral Estoppel"8
In State v. Braskett,"' the defendant, charged with failure to provide
for his minor child, moved for a blood test to determine paternity. 3 In
a prior action for failure to support the same child, the defendant had
pleaded guilty. Consequently, the state argued that the issue of paternity,
previously determined by the defendant's plea, could not be relitigated.
In upholding this contention, the court noted that all of the elements
of collateral estoppel were present." 9 The question, however, was
whether collateral estoppel applied to criminal proceedings, and the court
held that it did, ignoring prior Ohio cases which cast doubt on the mat-
ter.
140
transaction. Rather, it involves separate statements of the same offense proscribed by one
statute, OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.19. In this regard, there is a factual similarity between
Benjamin and Weed, in that Weed involved three offenses of unlawful possession of explo-
sives all of which offenses are prohibited by OHIO REv. CODE § 3743.25. However, note
that the maiming offenses carry different punishments. Maiming by putting out an eye is
punishable by imprisonment from three to thirty years. Maiming by means of a caustic sub-
stance is punishable, at the discretion of the court, by a maximum of life imprisonment.
OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.19. State v. Benjamin, supra, should be compared with In re Ben-
jamin, 100 Ohio App. 455, 137 N.E.2d 298 (1955). The latter case arose on petition for a
writ of habeas corpus filed in Franklin County where the petitioner was incarcerated. In point
of time, it preceded the appeal in State v. Benjamin, supra, which took place in Cuyahoga
County. In the habeas corpus case, the court, in dictum, stated that because the offenses arose
from the same act, the defendant should have been convicted of and sentenced for but one
offense. The court's statement with reference to conviction is wrong. OHIO REV. CODE §
2941.04 permits multiple convictions. The court's statement with reference to sentence is
clearly to be preferred to the holding in State v. Benjamin, supra. It is interesting to note
that in the decision on appeal the court makes no reference to the prior statements, by another
court, in the habeas corpus case.
136. For an excellent analysis of Ohio criminal cases dealing with res judicata and collateral
estoppel, see Note, 12 WEST. RES. L. REv. 402 (1961).
137. 162 N.E.2d 922 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
138. A blood test is provided for in OHIO REv. CODE § 2317.47. If the motion for a blood
test is properly made, denial is prejudicial error. State v. Snyder, 157 Ohio St. 15, 104 N.E.2d
169 (1952).
139. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies only to those issues actually litigated in the
former action. All that is required is identity of parties. It is not necessary that the same
cause of action be present. Collateral estoppel is to be distinguished from res judicata. The
latter doctrine applies not only to issues actually litigated but also to issues that could have
been litigated. The required elements are identity of parties and cause of action. State ex -el.
Ohio Water Service Co. v. Sanitary Dist., 169 Ohio St. 31, 157 N.E.2d 116 (1959).
140. Duvall v. State, 111 Ohio St. 657, 146 N.E. 90 (1924); Patterson v. State, 96 Ohio
St. 90, 117 N.E. 169 (1917). Each case involved a commingling of the issues of collateral
estoppel and double jeopardy. The court, in each case, evinced a decided reluctance to apply
collateral estoppel in a case in which the defense of double jeopardy failed because the offenses
were not the same. However, identity of offenses is not an element of collateral estoppel.
State ex rel. Ohio Water Service Co. v. Sanitary Dist., supra note 139. In general, on the
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The Braskett case appears to be the first Ohio decision in which it is
expressly held that collateral estoppel applies to criminal proceedings.
The holding is in accord with those of other jurisdictions, both state 41
and federal."
Post-Trial Motions - New Trial
Ohio Revised Code section 2945.79 provides for the granting of a
new trial "when new evidence is discovered material to the defendant,
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and pro-
duced at the trial." On its face, this provision is broad. However it has
been considerably narrowed by the judicially engrafted requirement that
a new trial should be granted only if there is a strong probability that the
new evidence will change the result in the case, and if the new evidence
is neither cumulative nor impeaching.'43 Some limitation is necessary to
avoid the granting of a new trial in a case in which the newly discovered
evidence could not reasonably affect the result. But whether the limita-
tion should extend beyond this point is open to serious question, par-
ticularly in view of the concept of reasonable doubt which underlies
Anglo-American criminal law. Assuredly, the limitations relating to
cumulation and impeachment are unnecessary. The basic problem con-
cerns the effect of the new evidence rather than some label attached to
it144it. T
Ultimately, attention must shift from the verbalization of the rule
to its application. Therein are the strengths and weaknesses of the rule
to be ascertained. In this regard, State v. Kicak, 4 already commented
upon, 46 is illuminating. The defendant was convicted, on bitterly con-
flicting evidence, of taking indecent liberties with a thirteen-year-old
girl. 4 7  After the trial, the complainant allegedly was heard to say, just
relationship between collateral estoppel and double jeopardy, see Gershonson, Res Judicata in
Successive Criminal Prosecutions, 24 BROOKLYN L. 11Ev. 12 (1957).
141. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 160 Mass. 165, 35 N.E. 773 (1893); People v. Majado, 22
Cal. App. 2d 323, 70 P.2d 1015 (1937) (in both cases, defendant was estopped from re-
litigating the issue of paternity); Annot., 147 A.LR. 991 (1943).
142. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
143. State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505, 76 N.E.2d 370 (1947); State v. Lopa, 96 Ohio St.
410, 117 N.E. 319 (1917).
144. It is true, of course, that in many cases the cumulative or impeaching nature of the
new evidence will be a substantial factor in a conclusion that the new evidence does not have
the desired effect. But it is more important to note that this "truth" is not all-inclusive, and
imagination can suggest numerous cases in which cumulative or impeaching evidence would
almost certainly result in an acquittal.
145. 168 NXE.2d 768 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949, rehearing denied,
364 U.S. 855 (1960).
146. Note 94 supra and accompanying text.
147. The defense was that the complainant's unwed mother was attempting to "shake down"
the defendant.
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